The answer to this question is not simple. However, it can be approached by recalling events that took place more than thirty years ago. During that period, complex geopolitical processes were unfolding, associated with the disintegration of the bipolar world order and the formation of a unipolar system.
After the collapse of the Soviet Union, the interest of leading global powers in the Republic of Kazakhstan was largely pragmatic. The United States of America and the People’s Republic of China were extremely concerned with the elimination of the strategic nuclear potential located on Kazakhstan’s territory. These weapons were capable of destroying both the United States and China multiple times over. Specifically, Kazakhstan hosted 1,040 nuclear warheads deployed on 104 R-36M intercontinental ballistic missiles (NATO classification: SS-18), which were aimed at the United States.
In addition, Kazakhstan possessed 40 Tu-95 strategic bombers equipped with 370 Kh-55 nuclear cruise missiles, primarily targeted at China. In total, the Republic of Kazakhstan inherited more than 1,400 nuclear delivery systems.
It should be clarified that although other former Soviet republics – namely Ukraine and Belarus – hosted an even larger number of nuclear weapons, their missiles were not aimed at either the United States or China.
The withdrawal of missiles targeted at the United States and China from Kazakhstan’s territory was also in Russia’s interest. Moscow feared that these weapons could fall into the hands of radical Islamic states. At that time, representatives of several Arab countries unsuccessfully attempted to establish contacts with Kazakhstan. For example, the Saudi Minister of Foreign Affairs was denied a visit, after which Saudi Arabia did not establish diplomatic relations with Kazakhstan until 1994.
Ultimately, by voluntarily disarming, the Republic of Kazakhstan resolved a problem that deeply concerned Washington, Beijing, and Moscow. Kazakhstan not only fully fulfilled its international obligations but also demonstrated that it was a predictable and reliable partner in the international arena.
It is also important to note that, unlike some other post-Soviet republics, Kazakhstan in the early 1990s showed a strong commitment to developing political and economic relations with Russia, with which it shares the longest continuous land border in Eurasia.
Efforts in the Russian direction were synchronized with engagement on the American track. This enabled Kazakhstan’s leadership to visit Washington and Moscow in both 1992 and 1994. In relations with China, Kazakhstan also achieved significant progress by becoming the first post-Soviet state to sign a border agreement with Beijing in 1995.
Undoubtedly, these achievements became possible thanks to Kazakhstan’s multi-vector foreign policy, which began to take shape in the mid 1990s. At the same time, these foreign policy initiatives were feasible largely because relations within the “triangle” of Russia, the United States, and China were not confrontational. The United States actively lobbied for Russia’s accession to the G8 and planned to develop cooperation with China within the framework of the so-called “Chimerica.”
During this period, intensive contacts between Kazakhstan’s leadership and the leaders of these major powers did not provoke suspicion or jealousy from Moscow, Washington, or Beijing.
However, as competition among the three powers intensified, it became increasingly difficult for Kazakhstan to pursue its multi-vector policy. There were periods when U.S. Democratic administrations under Presidents Bill Clinton and Barack Obama avoided high-level contacts with Kazakhstan’s leadership. At the same time, a fundamental divergence in approaches to the future world order emerged between Moscow and Beijing on one side and Washington on the other.
As the unipolar world finally collapsed and instability intensified in various regions, including the post-Soviet space, the West – led by the United States –began to present Astana with a stark choice: “either us or them.” This approach provoked negative reactions from Russia and China, with whom Kazakhstan sought to maintain close relations. In response, Beijing and Moscow actively promoted alternative international platforms designed to counter both Washington and the Bretton Woods institutions.
At the beginning of 2025, however, the situation began to change. A pragmatic politician came to power in Washington who, like the leaders of Russia and China, recognized that ongoing events in Eastern Europe – drawing in many countries – posed an existential threat to the international system. Today, many politicians speak alarmingly casually about the potential use of nuclear weapons.
A similar sense of danger existed among the leaders of China, the United States, and Russia in the mid 1990s. In an effort to reverse the escalation of the arms race, including nuclear weapons, and to prevent the collapse of existing arms control agreements, the leaders of Russia, the United States, and China conducted intensive bilateral negotiations throughout 2025, with international security as the central issue. It is possible that the United States and Russia (during the Anchorage summit), as well as Russia and China (during the summits held in May and September), reached certain strategic understandings.
Against this background, one of the central topics of high-level negotiations in these formats was undoubtedly the discussion of the situation in Eastern Europe. At the same time, all participants in the negotiation process shared the understanding that the absence of an acceptable solution to this problem – much like the unresolved issue of nuclear weapons on Kazakhstan’s territory in the early 1990s – constitutes an existential threat to the entire international community.
It is possible that during closed exchanges of views, the three key actors of the international system discussed the prospects and potential role of the President of the Republic of Kazakhstan, Kassym-Jomart Tokayev, in resolving this issue as a mediator.
This assumption is supported by the nature of Kazakhstan’s recent diplomatic contacts. While the results of the Kazakh-Russian and Kazakh-Chinese summits were widely discussed by experts, the exchange of messages initiated by D. Trump with K.K. Tokayev attracted significantly less attention. Meanwhile, among the notable and unconventional elements of Kazakh-Russian relations was the widely discussed informal “tea meeting” in the Kremlin during President Tokayev’s official visit to Moscow – an unusual step within Russian diplomatic protocol that raised many questions among analysts.
All of the above allows us to conclude that the main achievement of the foreign policy of the Republic of Kazakhstan in 2025 was the acquisition of a special status within the international system. This status enables Astana – much as it did in the early 1990s – to build pragmatic and balanced relations with each of its key foreign policy partners, including Russia, China, and the United States.
This outcome became possible due to the consistent implementation of Kazakhstan’s multi-vector diplomacy, the predictability of its foreign policy, and the growing international authority of the country’s leadership.
This conclusion is further supported by the fact of a “long telephone conversation” between the leaders of Kazakhstan and the United States on December 23. According to a statement published on the official website akorda.kz, President K.K. Tokayev emphasized “the complexity of resolving the Ukrainian conflict, where the territorial issue plays a dominant role and requires compromises from both sides, taking into account the real situation on the ground.” It is also known that D. Trump invited K.K. Tokayev to attend the upcoming G20 summit in Miami in 2026.
Rustem Kurmanguzhin, Associate Professor, Higher School of Artsand Social Sciences, NARXOZ University
Photo: https://www.istockphoto.com
